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I Introduction
One of the major sources of recent friction between Europeans and
Americans has been the interpretation of the economic implications of US
fiscal policies. Theorists and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic
have differed in the analysis of the role of budget deficits in affecting key
macroeconomic aggregates. Specifically, some have argued that large
budget deficits are responsible for the recently observed high real rates of
interest while others have claimed that budget deficits cannot be blamed
for these real rates. The latter group claimed that theory does not predict
a clear-cut relation between budget deficits and rates of interest and that
the empirical record itself is very weak.
The increased integration of the world economy resulted in increased
concern in each country over policy measures taken in the rest of the world.
The complex pattern of the economic linkages within the interdependent
world economy resulted in a variety of models of the transmission
mechanisms. These models include those that highlight the implications
of foreign trade multipliers, e.g. LINK models which build on a Keynesian
structure, as well as those that highlight the role of the terms of trade along
the lines of the elasticity approach to the balance of payments) In addition,
some analyses have examined whether disturbances can be transmitted
negatively to the rest of the world. For example, Laursen and Metzler have
shown that in a model without capital flows, domestic autonomous
government expenditures which raise domestic output, lower the level of
output abroad, i.e. domestic spendings are transmitted negatively to the
rest of the world.2 Parallel to these developments there were examinations
of the transmission mechanism along the lines of the Mundell-Fleming
models.3 These contributions were stimulated by the increased integration
of world capital markets. They highlight the interdependence between the
exchange-rate regime, the degree of capital mobility and the impact of
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macroeconomic policies. Here, the key factor in the transmission mechanism pta
has been the interaction between the rate of interest and the rate of pta
exchange. Thus, it was shown that in a model with capital mobility and (ii)
flexible exchange rates, an expansionary monetary policy is transmitted giv
negatively to the rest of the world whereas fiscal policy is transmitted inti
positively. More recently the large volatility of nominal exchange rates and bal
the associated changes in real exchange rates have stimulated modelling del
of exchange-rate dynamics which has focused on the role of expectations. of
This line of modelling also relied on the real rate of interest as a key factor dyi
in the transmission mechanism, but the focus on expectations introduced ho
an important dimension of dynamic considerations.4 pr
These theoretical studies were based on the premise that world capital CII
markets were indeed highly integrated. A separate branch of research has tra
examined this premise. In this context one line of inquiry tested the sec
implications of capital market integration for international equality of go'
rates of return. These studies include tests of equality of real rates of COl
interest as well as studies of covered interest arbitrage. By and large, the As
basic findings were favorable to the hypothesis that capital markets are P°
integrated.5 A second line of inquiry tested the implications of capital pri
markets integration for the relation between national saving and national
investment. These studies claimed that the positive correlation between
national saving and investment suggests that the degree of capital market
integration is somewhat limited.6 While there may be some dispute over SP
the exact degree of international capital mobility, there is no doubt that PC
the mobility of capital serves an important role in linking world rates of
interest and, thereby, in transmitting economic disturbances internationally. pr
In this paper we develop a model that is suitable for the analysis of(i) the an
linkage between fiscal spending and rates of interest, and (ii)the thi
international transmission mechanism of fiscal policies. Our model is
capable of generating a variety of patterns of links between fiscal spending in
and rates of interest, as well as a variety of patterns of international
transmissions of fiscal policies, tin
The key characteristics of our model are: (i) A fully integrated world ag$
capital market; (ii) full rationality of all economic agents whose decisions
are based on self fulfilling expectations and are subjected to temporal and th1,
intertemporal budget constraints, and (iii) government behavior that is
constrained by an intertemporal solvency requirement. The model is of a
general equilibrium nature and the various economies have access to, and ofi'
are governed by, world markets. These markets determine both temporal I'
prices (commodity terms of trade) and intertemporal prices (rates of
interest).7
SO
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played by wealth (permanent income) and the minimal role that is being
m played by current income in determining the levels of private spending;
(ii) the irrelevancy of the time pattern of taxes and government debt issue
given the pattern of government spending and the requirement of
intertemporal solvency;8 (iii) the dependence of the current account of the
balance of payments (and thereby the accumulation of national external
debt) on the entire path of government spending rather than onthe path
ig of budget deficits. We show that the impact of fiscal spending and the
IS.
* dynamicsof debt accumulation on the key macroeconomic aggregates at
or home and abroad depend on a comparison among various behavioral
e propensities. Thesecomparisons generate a multitude of' transfer problem
criteria' that are familiar from the theory of transfers in international
La trade.9 In the present context the relevant transfers are among private
sectors and government sectors through current and future taxes and
f government spendings, as well as between the home and the foreign
0 countries through the process of accumulation of external assets and debts.
• As a result of these transfers the key factors determining the impacts of
re policies are comparisons among (i) domestic and foreign patterns of
private sectors' spending, (ii) domestic and foreign private sectors' saving
propensities, and (iii) domestic and foreign patterns of governments'
en spending.
et The focus on the entire path of the level and composition of government
:er spending, also serves to highlight the importance of the distinction between
at permanent and transitory policies as well as between current and future
of policies. These distinctions along with the multitude of the 'transfer
problem criteria' are shown to be critical in accounting for the apparent
ambiguities in the effects of government spending on rates of interest and
he the related question of the nature of the international transmission of fiscal
is shocks. Our analysis attempts to isolate the roles of these critical factors
in determining the outcomes of government expenditures.
al In addition to providing a theoretical justification for the observed
linkages, our model also has implications for the choice of relevant
Id aggregate economic variables for empirical research. For example, our
analysis has implications for the expected patterns of the dependence of
the reduced form equations of each country's consumption function, on
is current and future fiscal spendings by the domestic as well as by the foreign
a governments. Similarly, our analysis has implications for the dependence
of the reduced-form equations of world rates of interest and commodity
prices on the paths of fiscal spendings.
of Previous models of the international transmissions of fiscal policies share
some of the features of our model. The novelty of the present analysis is
ng the integration of these features into a consistent analytical framework.
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This integration, however, has not been obtained without cost. At the acc
present stage our analysis is limited in several important dimensions. The
concluding section of the paper outlines some of the limitations and
suggests possible extentions.
Th
II One-commodity world val
In this part of the paper we analyze a model of the world economy which
produces and consumes a single composite commodity. We first outline
the analytical framework which is then applied to the analysis of the effects wh
of fiscal policies on interest rates and the nature of the international rat
transmission mechanism.
11.1 The analytical framework
The analytical framework of the model contains the specification I
ofproduction, consumption, the government and the foreign economy
whichinteract to determine the equilibrium of the world economy.
11.1.1 Production
Consider two countries each producing the same good. Let the As
path of the supply of output in each country be fixed at its full employment
thesupply of output at period t byand respectively, muj
where an asterisk designates variables pertaining to the foreign country. the4
sul
11.1.2 Consumption
Assume that the home country's utility function is logarithmic as rat
in equation (1) (5'
(I)
wheredenotes the subjective discount factor and where c denotes the rate as I
of consumption. The infinitely lived representative individual is assumed I




where1 denotes taxes at period t,denotes the one-period debt and rL of
denotes the one-period market interest rate. In addition to the budget pn
constraints in equation (2) there are two additional constraints which sul
govern the maximization problem. The first states the initial conditions ofFiscal expendituresand economic interdependence 41
the according to which the initial commitment of interest and amortization (B)
rhe is historically given as in equation (3)
Lnd (3)
The second is the solvency requirement according to which the present
value of debt must approach zero in the limit:
lim;B1=O (4)
tich
line wheredenotes the present-value factor which is composed of one-period
rates of interest compounded up to period t. Thus:
nal
and obviously=1.
Consolidating the set of the budget constraints in (2)and using equations
(3) and (4) yields
my
• =; ; 7—B (5)
h As can be seen, equation (5) is the present value constraint. It states that
the sum of the present values of the rates of consumption in all periods
• must equal wealth (W0), where the value of wealth consists of the sum of
" the present values of output streams (gross domestic products), minus the
y. sum of the present values of taxes and the initial debt commitment. It is
noteworthy that for the individual what matters is the present value of taxes
rather than their precise distribution over time.
as Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the consolidated constraint
(5), the competitive representative consumer is assumed to treat the market
rates of interest (which determineas given. Further, since we assume
"/ fullcertainty and rational expectations, the future rates of interest as well
ate as taxes and outputs are assumed to be known with perfect foresight.





As is seen, the rate of consumption in period t is proportional to the value
I of wealth in that period with (1—6) being the marginal (and the average)
get propensity to consume out of wealth. Thus, in this formulation, the
ich subjective discount factor, 8, is also the marginal propensity to save out
)flS of wealth. In order to solve for the value of debt in each period and thereby
• . .
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gain some insight into the dynamics of debt accumulation, we use whe





Equation (8) states that the value of debt in period t must make up for two
the difference between the present values (as of period t) of consumption cou
rates from period zero to period t, W0, and that of disposable
incomes, 7)cz7/;; in addition, the current debt must also cover (10'
payments of the (current value of the) initial debt commitment, B/as.
11. 1.3 Government whe
The government is assumed to spend at the rateSpending can
be financed by taxes and debt issue at the market rate of interest.
Government behavior, however, is constrained by the solvency requirement
according to which the present value of spending must equal the present




By substituting equation (9) into the private sector's consolidated budget




In what follows we refer toas output netofgovernment
11.1.4 The foreign economy
Individuals in the foreign country are also assumed to have a
logarithmic utility function
U" =E (I') for I
weç
wherean asterisk (*) designates variables pertaining to the foreign country.
Individualsin the foreign country are assumed to operate in the same world
capital market as those of the home country and thus they face the same
set of rates of interest. Analogously to equation (5), the consolidated
foreign budget constraint is
(5')





(8) In equation (IO')y' i.e., it denotes the value of foreign output
net of government spending. Finally, it is relevant to note that, in our
for two-country world, the home country's debt, B, appears as the foreign
ion country's asset.
ble Maximization of the foreign utility function, (1'), subject to the constraint




est. 11.1.5 World equilibrium and debt
ent In our frictionless world, market clearing equilibrium requires that
ent at each period of time world private sectors' demand for output equals
the supply of world output net of government absorption. Using the








Since=1we can use (12) for 1= 0to obtain
e a (13)
To gain insight into the dynamics of the rates of interest we substitute




(5') Likewise, we substitute for W from equation (13) into equation (12) to
obtain:
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(1—8'w wo
= —, (14') on
Yt
1
Equations (14)—(14') show that the present-value factors,dependon del:
three quantities: (i) the levels of the marginal propensities to save, 8 and
(ii) the difference between these saving propensities, 8 —8; and (iii) the of
percentage growth of world output, g. As is seen, when the marginal
propensities to save are equal to each other,= —ge). In that case the
a rise in the saving propensity and a fall in the growth of output raise the (
present-value factors, i.e. lower the rates of interest since both changes raise
world savings at the initial rates of interest. If world output is stationary,
i.e. if=0,the magnitude of the present-value factors are bounded coij
between 8*t andInthat case the rates of interest are bounded between but
the two countries' subjective rates of discount. Ofl
The solution for and the sequence of the present value factors, Di11
canbe obtained from equations (12H13) and either (10) or (10'); this
latter degree of freedom is due, of course, to Walras' Law.







(1 _8*){yo[8*t Z by
= — (17) the
Yt4 8*,
whereA = E 6tAt>0,
t—O t0
and where At denotes the share of foreign product net ofgovernment
spending, i.e. At analogouslydenotesthe corresponding share of
ofthe home country, i.e. (Yt/Yt)1 —At.
The requirement that the rates of consumption in both countries are
positive imply that both W0 and are positive. Inspection of equations in
(15).—(16) reveals that these requirements imply restrictions on the initial whd.
debt position, B, as well as on the values ofand At which reflect the are
patterns of government spending. It may be seen that the maximal size of dW
the initial value of debt in the system depends positively on the value of —dFiscal expenditures and economic interdependence 45
world output, and on the marginal propensities to save, and it also depends
14" on the patterns of government spending.
/
. Thedynamics of the system is affected through changes in each country's
debt position. The impact of these changes in debt positions can be
Ofl analyzed and interpreted in terms of concepts familiar from the analysis
and of international transfers. To obtain insights into the economic factors
the governing the dynamics of the system we now turn to an examination of
ma! the effects of a redistribution of the world debt position.
Consider a transfer of assets from the home country to the foreign
the country. This transfer amounts to an increase in the value of B which
aise measures the home country's debt. The impact of the transfer on each
ary, country's consumption and, thereby, on the process of further redistri-
ded butions of debt through international transactions depends on its impact
ieen
I onboth countries' wealth as well as on the path of world interest rates.









Wemay conclude that, following a transfer from the home country,
dW'/dB>O, dW0/dB <0, and sign =sign
(16) In interpreting these results consider the effect of the transfer on world
savings at the initial rates of interest. The transfer raises foreign wealth
by dB and lowers domestic wealth by the same amount. Consequently, at
(17) the prevailing rates of interest, world savings change by (8* —8) dB. If
6* > 8 the transfer induces positive world savings. Restoration of equi-
librium with zero savings requires a fall in the rates of interest so as to
discourage savings and stimulate current consumption through secondary
changes in wealth. The secondary changes in wealth are brought about
Lent through the impact of the changes in the rates of interest on the valuation
tare of wealth. When 6* > 8 the rates of interest must fall, i.e., the values of
—thepresent-value factor —mustrise as indicated by equation (17). The
are fall in the rates of interest raises each country's wealth. The secondary rise
tOnS in wealth reinforces the initial effect of the transfer on foreign wealth
itial whereas it mitigates the loss in wealth to the transferer. These mechanisms
the are illustrated by equations (15)—(l7). As may be seen, when 8* =8,
e of dW'/dB =—dW0/dB = 1whereas when 8*6,dW0*/dB Iand
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The preceding analysis of the effect of the transfer on the initial wealth
positions and on the path of the rates of interest provides the ingredients
of the effects of wealth reallocation that occur during the dynamic
processes of the interdependent economies. Specifically, in our world with sp
no investment, one country's savings must equal the other country's Cu:
dissaving. And the analysis of transfers reveals that if the marginal saving see
propensity of the country which is a net accumulator of assets exceeds that Sul
of the other country, then the subsequent path will be characterized by in 1
lowerinterest rates (i.e., higher present-value factors), a higher value of pre
the accumulator's wealth, a lower value of the decumulator's wealth and to
a higher value of world's wealth.
Before turning to various comparative statics it is already evident that
in this model fiscal expenditures affect the equilibrium only through their
impact on net disposable incomes, yg —and —Gt*.There- whj
fore, their impact is equivalent to that of an exogenous change in gross
domestic product.
Since individuals are only concerned with the present value of taxes which
inturn are equal to the present value of government spendings, it follows
that the details of government finance through either taxes or debt issue
do not affect the equilibrium of the system as long as the government
solvency requirements are met. This is the Ricardian equivalence that is
Su embedded in the present model.
11.2 The impact of fiscal expenditures
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal spending in one
country on world rates of interest and on the patterns of consumption in
the rest of the world. The interdependence of private sectors' spending on dirt
foreign fiscal spending results from the impact of fiscal policies on the entire
path of rates of interest which, in turn, are common to both countries.
Thus, in this interdependent world fiscal spending in one country is
'financed' by crowding out of private spending in both countries.
Since private spending depends only on wealth position, it is important
to examine the impact of government spending on wealth. That impact
in turn depends on disposable incomes as well as on the time pattern of and
the rates of interest. Since that pattern depends on the precise timing of mat
government spending, we will analyze in detail situations in which changes of
in government spending are transitory as well as those in which they are
permanent. To avoid repetitive examples we focus in the subsequent
analysis on the impact of fiscal expenditures in the home country on world
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11.2.1Transitory government spending
Consider the effect of a transitory reduction in domestic fiscal
spending in period s on the rates of interest and on foreign and domestic
current spending. Since consumption is proportional to wealth, we will
seek to determine the effects of fiscal spending on the levels of wealth.
Suppose first that the change in fiscal spending is expected to take place
in the future (i.e. s * 0). To solve for the effect of dy8 on the path of the
present-value factors, wefirst differentiate equation (12) and use (13)
to obtain:
dzg
1 18 —) ()
where




Substituting (18) into (19) yields after some manipulations
(20)
dy8 4
Since y0 is given, domestic and foreign wealth must change in opposite
directions so as to ensure an unchanged value of world consumption in
period 0. Thus from (13) and (20) it follows that:
(21)
dy4 (1—8)4
Equations (20) and (21) imply therefore that a transitory future
reduction in domestic fiscal spending raises current private consumption
and lowers current foreign consumption. As shown in these equations, the
magnitude of the change in current consumption depends on the timing
of the given fiscal change, as well as on the relative size of the two
economies. A given fiscal change that is expected to occur in the distant
future will have a smaller impact on current consumption than a similar
change that is expected to occur in the near future. This dependence is
reflected in the value ofthepresent value factor, which diminishes with
the passage of time. Finally, it is noteworthy that the change in world
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wealth [(dW0 + dW')/dy8] depends only on the difference between the two whi
saving propensities; if 88* world wealth remains unchanged.
The solution of the effect of the future transitory fiscal change on the
path of the present-value factors is obtained by differentiating (17) with
respect toy8 for I =s *0: Eqt
x8(l _8*) 1(1 _8*8) 1
* (18') thei
dy3 y84L1—8 t8 I





Equation (18') shows that a future transitory rise in net output occurring
inperiod s, must lower the contemporaneous value ofwhich is the spen
relative price of consumption in period sin terms of current consumption. prod
This change in relative price is necessary to eliminate the incipient excess
supply of goods in period s. mark
Equation (18") shows that the effect of the future transitory rise in net muss
output on the present-value factors in all other periods depends on the med
difference between the marginal propensities to save. The interpretation opel
of this result can be given in terms of the previous analysis of debt transfer.
Here, the rise in domestic wealth and the fall in foreign wealth (arising from inte
the changes in y8 andimply that, at the prevailing present-value factors goc
of all other periods (t + s) the difference between 8 and 8* determines perU
whether world savings are positive or negative and, therefore, whether Thi
must rise or fall. stiti
To explore further the role of timing on the transitory shock suppose dur
that the reduction in fiscal spending (or equivalently, the rise in net output)
occurs at the present, i.e. s =0.In that case, at the initial rates of interest, in t
the rise in current domestic ouput raises domestic wealth by the same of t
amount and, thereby, creates an excess supply of current goods. To restore
equilibrium the relative prices of current consumption in terms of
consumptions in all other periods (i.e., the rates of interest) must fall.
Equivalently, the present-value factors, ;, must rise. These changes imply
that both domestic and foreign wealth must rise. Formally, using equations of ti.
(12)—(13) and (19) we obtain: frop
V 8tA* ofti?
dW* >0 (20') ma
dy0 4 1=Fiscal expendituresandeconomic interdependence 49
two which, together with equation (13) implies that
dW0 (1 dW (1
ithe >0 (21)
Equations (20')—(21') show that a transitory reduction in domestic current
fiscal spending (i.e. a rise in Yo) raises the values of current wealth and
(18') thereby the values of private consumption in both countries.
To summarize, it was shown that a future transitory change in fiscal
spending results in opposite changes in current domestic and foreign
wealth. In general, for all periods during which the fiscal spending remains
unchanged, market clearing requires that world private spending must also
(18") remain unchanged. Therefore, during those periods the fall in foreign wealth
must be accompanied by a rise in domestic wealth. Whether the rates of
rring interest linking the present period with other periods during which the fiscal
s the spending remain unchanged, rise or fall, depends on whether the domestic
ition. propensity to save exceeds or falls short of the foreign savings propensity.
xcess In contrast, during the period in which the fiscal change takes place,
market clearing requires that the change in world private consumption
n net must equal (with opposite sign) the change in government spending. The
n the mechanism which brings about the necessary changes in private spending
ation operates through changes in the rates of interest. For example a current
isfer. transitory reduction in domestic fiscal spending creates, at prevailing
from interest rates, domestic (and therefore world) excess supply of present
•ctors goods which is eliminated by a fall in interest rates linking the present
nines period with the period during which the reduction in fiscal spending occurs.
ter This fall in interest rates raises foreign and domestic wealth and serves to
stimulate both domestic and foreign current private consumption. Thus,
pose during the period in which the transitory fiscal changes occur, domestic
tput) and foreign wealth must move in the same direction. The complex changes
in the paths of the rates of interest are reflected in complicated alterations
same of the term structure of interest rates.
store
ts of 11.2.2 Permanent government spending
fall. Consider now the effects of a permanent reduction in domestic
mply fiscal spending on foreign and domestic private consumption. The effects
tions of the permanent change on the current value of wealth can be computed
from the previous expressions. For example, the effect of a permanent
change in fiscal spending (dy) on foreign wealth is equivalent to the sum
of the effects of all current (dy0) and future transitory changes (dy8) of equal
(20') magnitudes. Thus, adding (20') to the sum of the expressions in (20) for
t= 1,2,..., yields the effect of an equivalent permanent change, as in (22).




The sign of dW/dy depends on the relations betweenand; which, as tF
shown by equation (14) depends on the relation between the two countries' sc
saving propensities and on the rate of growth of world output net of T
government absorption. Specifically, for the stationary case with gg =0, m
exceeds; if 6 exceeds 8*. In that case a permanent rise in y raises the
current value of foreign wealth, and vice versa. On the other hand, when
the saving propensities are equal to each other (i.e., when 8* =8),the
permanent change in y alters foreign wealth only if gg + 0. Thus when
8* =8,dW'/dy is positive if world output (net of government absorption)
exhibits positive growth, and vice versa. ir4
We now turn to examine the effect of the permanent change in domestic
fiscal spending on the current value of domestic wealth. Differentiating





Equation (23) demonstrates that a permanent fall in government spending C
(that is, a rise in y) must raise domestic wealth.
The effect of the permanent fall in domestic fiscal spending (i.e., a
permanent rise in net output) on the rates of interest can be ascertained
from the effect of this change on world savings at the prevailing rates of
interest. The rise in net domestic output changes current domestic savings
by [dy0 —(1 —6) In the stationary case, with the prevailing rates of I
interest, the percentage change in domestic output, dy0/y0 equals
the percentage change in domestic wealth In that case the in-
cipient change in domestic savings is —(1 —6) where the term
in the brackets measures the initial value of domestic savings. Clearly at
the prevailing rates of interest, foreign savings do not change. As is evident, d
the initial value of domestic savings is positive if the domestic marginal
propensity to save exceeds the foreign propensity, i.e. if 8> 8* (in that case
equilibriumrequiresthatinitiallyforeignsavings werenegative).
Conversely, if 8 < 8*, domestic savings were negative. Thus, the permanent
fall in domestic fiscal spending (the rise in y), raises world savings and
induces a fall in the rates of interest if 8> 8*, and vice versa.1'Fiscal expendituresandeconomic interdependence 51
III Two-commodity world
The analysis in Section 11 was confined to a world with a single composite
commodity. In that world, therefore, the only relevant relative price was
as that of consumption in different periods, i.e. the rate of interest. In this
es' section we extend the model so as to allow for two different commodities.
of Therefore, in addition to the intertemporal terms of trade, the extended
o modelalso incorporates the role of the more conventional terms of trade,
:he i.e. the relative price of importables in terms of exportables.
en
he 111.1 The incorporation of the terms of trade and world
-en equilibrium
•)n) Let the home country exportable good be denoted by x and its
importable good by m. To simplify the analysis assume that each country
tic is completely specialized in production. Thus good x is only produced in
.ng the home country at the level X and good m is only produced in the foreign
• country at the level M. Consumers on the other hand are assumed to
consume both goods but since tastes may differ across countries, con-
sumption patterns may differ. More formally, the expanded menu of goods
-'3) is now incorporated into the utility function (1) by noting thatin (I) is




of logcg/3 log —/3)log
igs
of In order to specify the budget constraint it is convenient to define current
als private expenditure by; where
at thus, ; measures private spending in units of good x in period t and Pt
denotes the relative price of good m in terms of good x. Government
spending also falls on both goods; denotes government spending on
ise x and Gmt denotes government spending on m. Thus, the private sector's
e). constraint, analogous to (5) becomes
nd =E (5')
t—o t—o
Inequation (5'), the right hand side defines We,, the value of wealth in period
0. Equation (5') also incorporates the government budget constrainta
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according to which the present value of government spending equals the
present value of taxes. In this specification B is denominated in units of x.
W
Maximization of the utility function (1') subject to the budget constraint
(5') yields the spending function Zgwhichis analogous to the consumption




Equations (6'H7')determinesthe pattern of intertemporal spending. In
the present two-good world, individuals also need to determine the
temporal allocation of spending between the two goods. The solution of




As usual, the marginal propensities to spend on each good, ,8 and 1 —/1
respectively, are the exponents of the Cobb-Douglas composite good
Before turning to the analysis of equilibrium it is relevant to emphasize
that 8 measures the marginal propensity to save out of wealth whereas /1 A
measures the marginal propensity to consume good x out of spending. In
this framework as in the previous section, behavior is governed by
permanent income (wealth) and the effect of current income in governing
current behavior is only indirect.
The foreign country is modelled in an analogous fashion. Output in the s
foreign country, is Mg, and the government is assumed to purchase i
of good x (which is imported from the home country) and of good
m. The maximization problem is subjected to the private sector's initial ol
wealth, W', and its solution yields the saving propensity,and the p1
marginal consumption propensities, /1* and (1 _/3*).
In order to facilitate the analysis of comparative statics we define is
henceforthas domestic product net of the home country's government
spending on domestic product, andas the foreign product net of the 01'
foreigncountry's government spending on its product. Thus
S
t
The equilibrium conditions are analogous to those in Section II except
that, in the present expanded framework, equilibrium requires that the gFiscal expenditures and economic interdependence 53
world market for each good clears. Using the demand functions the
c. equilibrium conditions for both goods are:
tt 6t oat




In period 0, z0 =1,and therefore, the market clearing conditions for t =0
became
/3(1 —8) W0+/1*(l _8*)=x0—G0 (28)
• (29)
Po Po
where the values of wealth are
5)
• (30)
W = —;+ B (31)
t—o
/3 Asbefore, by Walras' Law, we may ignore one of the equations in the
n system.
Inspection of the equilibrium conditions (26)—(31) reveals that the
relevant exogenous variables are and Gmt; given the values of
these variables the full solution can be obtained. This observation also
suggests the particular channel through which government spending
influences world equilibrium. Specifically, it is evident that government
d spending on goods produced in its own country exerts an identical effect
on the equilibrium as an equivalent change in the level of domestic
e production of that good. Thus, a given rise inyields the same effect
whether it is caused by a rise in the level of production,or by a fall
e in government spending on that good Further, in this two-good world
the composition of government spending is crucial for the characteristics
e of world equilibrium. A given change in the total level of government
spending affects world interest rates in a manner analogous to that of the
one-good world. The key source for the interest-rate effect is that, in
contrast with the government, which is essentially a zero saver, the private
sector may either save or dissave parts of its income. Here, in addition to
the interest rate effect, the composition of government spending also
t influences the relative price of the two goods since the pattern of
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a given rise in Gxg may exert a different influence on world equilibrium than
a rise in of equal value.
An explicit solution of the full system (26)—(31) is cumbersome. In order
to highlight the key economic factors that affect the equilibrium, we now
turn to a simplified version of the model. We assume that the paths of
outputs and governments spending are stationary. Thus, let=x,







o— (x_G:)[/3*(1 —8)Gm]+ftflt (mx—GGm)(8*_8)
(33)





The explicit solution for p0 can be obtained by substituting (33) for W
into (34).
To gain insight into the determinants of Po we note that the equilibrium
price must equate one country's trade balance surplus with the other's trade
deficit or equivalently, the equilibrium price must ensure that the value of
world spending on goods equals the value of world output. Thus, the
equilibrium price p0 must satisfy equation (35):
[(18) W0 ++p0 Gm] —X=PoM[(l —8") We" ++p0
(35)
where the left-hand-side of(35) measures the home country's trade balance
deficit and the right-hand-side measures the foreign country's trade
balance surplus. To ensure that the market for each good clears we use
the market clearing condition for good x in period t =0(equation (28))
and substitute for W0 into the trade balance condition (35); the solution
for p0 yields equation (34).
111.2 The impact of debt redistribution
The equilibrium of the system described in section 111.1 was
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dynamics of the system is effected through changes in each country's debt
position. Like in the one-good world, the dynamic process may be associated
with changes in interest rates, depending on the effect of debt redistribution
r on world savings. In the two-goods world the dynamic process may also
be associated with changes in relative prices, depending on the effect of
debt redistribution on excess demands for goods. When such changes in
relative prices occur the impact of changes in real rates of interest on wealth
and thereby on consumption also depends on the path of relative prices.
In this section we deal with these issues.
Consider first the impact of a transfer of assets from the home to the
foreign country. From equations (32)—(33) we note that the rise in the value
of B raises foreign wealth by a factor proportional to /1(1 —ô)(m — Gm)and
2) lowers domestic wealth by a factor proportional to fl*(l _8*)(m_G)
These changes in wealth alter the demand for goods, and, as seen from
equations (32) and (34), induce a change in the relative price. The direction
of the change in the relative price depends on the sign of (/i_fl*).Thus,
3) conforming with the well-known transfer problem criterion, a redistribution
of wealth towards the foreign country raises the relative price of foreign
goods if(l the foreign marginal propensity to spend on these goods,
exceeds (1 —fi),thehome country's marginal propensity to spend on
foreign goods or, equivalently, if fi>
Todetermine the effect of the transfer on real consumption in the
presence of changes in relative prices we need to defi.ne a price index which
m will then be used for evaluating the real values of consumption and wealth,
le as well as in real rates of interest. We define the price index associated with
one unit of the consumption bundle ct as and, correspondingly, the
foreign price index is defined Formally, the domestic price index
is obtained by minimizing the cost Cmt associatedwith obtaining
one unit of the consumption bundle the resulting index is the
(utility based) true consumer price index. Analogously, the foreign price
index is obtained by minimizing the cost of obtaining one unit of the
foreign consumption bundle.
le Using the price index, the values of real consumption,and Ce4'are
related to private spendings,andaccording to= and
= whicharealsoequalto(1 —8) andto
(1 —84') respectively. Therefore, in order to evaluate the impact
of debt transfer on real consumptions we need to evaluate its impact on
the values of real wealth.'3 Since the value of real wealth depends on the
paths of the present-value factors and prices, we first examine the impact
is of the transfer on the present value factor which expresses the rates of
ie interest in terms of good x.56 Jacob A. Frenkel and Assal
Using equations (26), (28) and (3 2) and assuming that initially government tr
spendings are zero, the present-value factor measured in terms of good x r
can be written as: th
(1 _8*) [(1 —/l)x+(l—6)/JB](8*t_8e)
x[l_(l_ft)8*_fl8] (36)
As may be seen, the effect of a transfer on ; depends on the relation lfl
between8 and 6*. A rise in B lowers(i.e., raises the rate of interest in ri
terms of good x) if 6>In that case the interest rate effect of the
transfer operates to lower the recipient country's wealth. P
To compute the present value-factor in terms of good mweuse Slit.
equations (27), (32) and (33) and obtain: gct
(l__18)x[/l*(1_8)8t+(l_/i*)(l_8*)8*t]
+(l_8*)(1 —8)[/i(l _/J*)(6*t)_/3*(I —/J)6t]B
fl*m[1_(l_fl)8*_/38] (36)
Asmay be seen, the effect of a transfer on dependsonthe relation
between the propensities to save, 8 and 8*, and the propensities governing o
thepatterns of spending, /Jand/J*. As is evident, when/i =fl*, thetransfer
does not alter the commodity terms of trade and the effects of the transfer
depend only on the relation between the marginal propensities to save. In
that case the present value factors in terms of x and m move in the same TI
direction. 6
Having examined all the ingredients of the real values of wealth, we no.w
turn to examine the effects of the transfer on the real values of consumption
starting with the receiving country's consumption. Using equations (32)
and (34) is it shown in Appendix II that around an initial equilibrium with





An examination of (37) reveals that when /1 =/1*,i.e., when a transfer 11!
doesnot alter the commodity terms of trade, then a receipt of a transfer
must raise real consumption. In this case, all goods may be aggregated into
a single composite commodity and the analysis reduces to that of the
one-commodity world of Section II. Likewise, when 8 =8*,i.e., when a
transfer at the initial terms of trade does not alter world savings, then a
receipt of a transfer will also necessitate a rise in real consumption. In this
caseexpenditures must equal income in each country so as to eliminate d
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transfer problem analysis where it is known that a receipt of a transfer must
raise real consumption. In the general case both ft*ft*and8 * 8*, and
the transfer alters the commodity terms of trade —thetemporal relative
price of goods —andthe rates of interest —theintertemporal terms of trade.
It is noteworthy, however, that even in cases for which the transfer results
in a higher consumer price index and in higher rates of interest (measured
in terms of good x) the value of the receiving country's real wealth must
rise along with the value of its real consumption.'4
We now turn to examine the effect of the transfer on the value of the
paying country's real consumption. Using equations (32)—(34) it is also
shown in Appendix II that around the initial equilibrium with zero




Equations (37)—(38) can be examined for special cases. When ft=
thetransfer does not alter the commodity terms of trade and all goods may
be aggregated into a single composite commodity as in Section II. When
8 =8*the transfer, at the initial terms of trade, does not alter world savings
and expenditures must equal income in each country so as to eliminate
intertemporal trade. In both of these cases it is obvious that the transfer
raises foreign real consumption and lowers domestic real consumption.
The same qualitative results remain in the general case (with /3 * /3* and
8 * 8*) for which the transfer alters the temporal and the intertemporal
terms of trade.
The preceding analysis determined the effect of a change in debt on the
initial levels of real consumption in both countries (each in terms of its
own price index). In that discussion the cause for the change in debt was
an exogenous transfer. In general, however, the international reallocation
of debt results from the dynamic processes which characterize each
country's income-spending decisions and which are reconciled through the
equilibrium condition that world savings must be zero. The expressions
in equations (37) and (38) can also be used to determine at each point the
impact of current account surpluses and deficits (i.e. of changes in debt
holdings) on the current levels of real consumption. Since from (7')
= W0 and =(8*t/zt)W', it follows that whether the home
country accumulates or decumulates wealth, i.e. whether its debt falls or
rises, depends on whether rises or falls with the passage of time. If
8* >8it is seen from equation (36) that over time the home country's debt
increases and its real consumption falls, while the foreign country's debt
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The effects of government spending
In this section we analyze the effects of fiscal spending on the
patterns of consumption in the various countries. The two-good world
contains additional channels of interdependence that were not present in
the one-good world of Section II. Since the relative prices of goods reflect
the pattern of spending in both countries, the analysis of fiscal policies
needs to specify the spending patterns of the government. In general it will
be seen that the impact of policies depends on relations between various
behavioral propensities. Specifically, the key factors determining the
outcomes of policies are differences among the spending patterns and the
saving propensities of four groups: foreign and domestic private sectors
as well as foreign and domestic governments. These differences govern the
evolution of relative prices and rates of interest following fiscal changes.
In order to avoid tedious derivations we will focus in this section on the
effects of permanent changes in the home country's government spending
on domestic goods and those in which it falls on foreign goods. In these
cases we will examine the effects of the policies on the values of real
consumption at home and abroad which, to recall, are defined as:
=(I and
c' =(1—8)
Using equations (32)—(34) it is shown in Appendix III that the logarithmic
derivatives of real consumptions with respect to changes in government
spending on domestic goods, and on foreign goods, Gm, evaluated













dlogc0 1 l+RS1 —(1—j9)l+Ri dGmniLfl*Q
1_(l_fl)8*_fl8>0





Asmay be seen, a rise in fiscal spending on domestic goods lowers the
ill values of real consumption at home and abroad. The reduction in foreign
us consumption thus 'finances' part of the increased government spending.
he The proportional reduction in foreign real consumptions is i.e.,the
he relative share of foreign spending on good x. Analogously, the proportional
rs reductionthe home country's private sector's real consumption is ft.
he Thus, when the home country's government increases spending on the
domestic good the extent of the reduction in the values of real consumptions
he of the private sectors in both countries depends on the importance of that
ng good in private sectors' budgets. The precise effects of a rise in government
• spending on foreign goods depends on the magnitudes of the various
propensities as may be seen from equations (40) and (42).
In order to highlight the role of the government's spending propensities
we define the government spending function G as:
• GGx+PGm (43)
and we assume that the government spending ties are ftc on good
iic x, and (1 —ftc) on good m. Thus:
nt G and pGm =(1ftc) G,
ed
ro which implies that, formally, Gm becomes a function of GmGm(Gx).










2) To obtain insights into the economic factors which are at play, we now
turn to examine some special cases. These cases correspond to specific
assumptions about some of the marginal propensities. We start with the
case in which the domestic and foreign marginal propensities to save are60 Jacob A. Frenkel and Assaf Razin
the same, i.e., 8 =In that case using equations (39)—(40) and the
specification of government spending which is embodied in (45) along with






Equation (46) reveals that when 8 =the effect of domestic fiscal
spending on foreign real consumption depends on differences among the
patterns of spending of domestic private and public sectors, as well
as between domestic and foreign private sectors,fl_fl*.Theeconomic
interpretation of this result is as follows. When 6 we know from th
equation (36) that in both countries the interest rate equals the subjective th
discount rate. Therefore, in each country savings are zero. In that case, on
neither the rates of interest, nor the total level of world spending are altered sa4.
in response to government spending since the government, like the private
sectors, is a zero saver. It follows that the potential effect of fiscal policies that
can only operate through changes in relative prices. In conformity with if
the standard analysis of economic transfers, such changes can occur only
if the spending patterns differ among private and public sectors.
To demonstrate the role of the spending patterns consider the following
special cases:
(i)Whenall spending patterns are identical, i.e., when /3 ==fic'we be•
note from equation (46) that d log c/dG =0.Thus, in this special case,
/3
the effects of fiscal policy are not transmitted internationally and only
the domestic private sector is crowded out. In that case aggregate
behavior in the various markets are not affected by the fiscal policy
and, therefore, there are no changes in relative prices.
(ii) When the spending patterns of the domestic and foreign private
sectors are identical, i.e. when /3 =/3*,we note from equation (46) that
fin
the direction of the change in foreign real consumption following a .
risein domestic fiscal spending depends only on the difference between
Ifl
/3, the private sectors' spending pattern, and /)G' the corresponding
government spending pattern. If/I >flu, arise in government spending
b creates an excess supply of good x and an excess demand for good
m at the initial relative price. Equilibrium is restored through a rise
in p, the relative price of good m. This rise in p raises the real value
in
of foreign wealth and, thereby, raises real consumption. The preceding on
discussion also implies that in the extreme case in which=I,i.e.
w
when government spending falls entirely on good x, foreign real
consumption must fall (as was already shown in equation (39)). At theFiscal expenditures and economic interdependence 61
other extreme, when= 0,i.e.,whengovernment spending falls
•_ :he entirely on good m,(thecase which corresponds to equation (40)), the
ith value of foreign real consumption must rise. The effect of the rise in
government spending on the home country's real consumption must
always be negative independent of the patterns of government spending.
Thus, in conformity with the traditional results of economic transfers,
46) the secondary gain that might occur through an improvement of the
terms of trade cannot offset the primary loss which in the present case
is the tax levied to finance government spending.
the
well The preceding analysis was confined to the case in which each country's
nic income equaled its spending since 6 was assumed to equal 8*.Asa result,
om the international transmission of fiscal policies operated entirely through
:ive the effects of these policies on the relative price of goods without any impact
se on the rates of interest. We turn now to examine the case in which the
red saving propensities differ, i.e. 88*.Inorder to isolate the effects of
ate differences between private and public spending patterns we will assume









and vice versa. As may be seen, the sign in (46') depends on the relation
we between the spending patterns of the private sectors and the government,
ise, ftandfiG' as well as on the relation between the saving propensities 8 and




sign (8* —8) (46")
In that case the patterns of world spending on goods are independent of
a
fiscal policies since ft= fig' = fig. Thereforethe two goods can be aggregated
into a composite commodity and the analysis reduces to that of the
one-good world. And, as seen in equation (46") the key factor determining
ing the effect of fiscal spending on foreign real consumption is the relation
)od between 8 and 8. Analogously to the analysis of equation (22) (where we
ise analyzed the effect of a rise in output net of government absorption), the
lue interpretation of this result is in terms of the effect of government spending
ing on the rate of interest. If 6* >8,the foreign country saves part of its income
i.e. whereas the domestic economy dissaves; thus the domestic country's
eal marginal propensity to save out of incomeisnegative. In that case, a rise
the in the home country's government spending amounts to transferring62 Jacob A. Frenkel and Assaf Razin
income from a dissaver (the home country's private sector) to a zero saver
(the government), thereby creating (at the prevailing rates of interest) ar
excess world savings. To restore equilibrium the rates of interest must fall.
The fall in the rates of interest raises foreign wealth and real consumption.
The opposite occurs when 8* <8. In that case government spending lowers
world savings and raises interest rates and, thereby, lowers foreign wealth T
and real consumption. In that case, the effect of government spending on re
the home country's real consumption is always negative and the analysis re
is analogous to that of the one-commodity world equation (24). As usual, al
the secondary gain arising from a fall in the rate of interest (that occurs
when> 8) cannot outweigh the primary loss from the tax that is levied
to finance government spending. fc
The preceding analysis focused on the nature of the international
transmission of domestic fiscal spending. One of the central mechanisms lSj
through which the transmission is effected operates through the effects of
fiscal spending on real rates of interest. In what follows we elaborate on g9
the effects of fiscal spending on the real rates of interest.
The example underlying equation (46") assumes that the of
spending are identical among domestic and foreign governments and
private sectors. The assumption that fi= fi* impliesthat the real rates of
interest are equal across countries. The additional assumption that ,8 =fic
implies that the effects of changes in fiscal spending on the real rates of
interest depend only on the differences between the domestic and the r
foreign saving propensities. e
The example underlying equation (46'), assumes that the spending
patterns of the domestic and foreign private sectors differ from those of °J
thegovernment, i.e. that fiG =fi*In that case real rates of interest
are equal across the world but the impact on the real rates of government
spending depend not only on the relation between. the two countries' saving
propensities but also on the relation between fi and ft0. In the more general
case for which all spending patterns differ, real rates of interest differ across
countries and the effect of government spending on these rates is more
complex.
r
To illustrate, consider the special case in which government spending
falls entirely on the domestically produced good, i.e. 1. The effects
of government spending on the real rates of interest can be computed from
their effects on the present-value factors measured in terms of the
consumption baskets. The domestic and foreign real present-value factors
are and respectively. It is shown in Appendix IV that:
(47)1
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vet and
=—(I_fi*) (47')
ers Thus, a reduction in government spending(i.e. a rise in x) lowers the
real present-value factors in both countries and raises the corresponding
Ofl real rates of interest. In contrast with the case of equality among private
and public spending patterns in which the direction of changes in real rates
ual, of interest depended on the relation between saving propensities, here these
•airs propensities play no role. In the present case with fl0 =1domestic and
'ied foreign real rates of interest move in the same direction. The extent of their
response to fiscal spending depends on the relative share of the good which
is not consumed by the government (good m) in private sector's spending.
In the intermediate case for which government spending falls on both
s of goods but the relative share fiG exceeds the corresponding shares of the
Ofl private sectors, fiandfl's,theeffect of government spending on the real
rates of interest reflects the influence of both spending patterns and saving
of propensities. For example, if 8 a reduction in government spending
and lowers world savings (as shown in Section II) and thereby reinforces the
s of effects embodied in equations (47H47').Onthe other hand, if 8 < 8*,the
• impactof government spending on world savings and, thereby, on the real
rates of interest tends to mitigate and may reverse the effects operating via
e equations (47)—(47').
• We have shown in this section that the effects of government spending
1 on world rates of interest and the nature of the international transmission
0 mechanism depend on the multitude of 'transfer problem criteria'. These
rest include the relations between saving propensities and spending patterns of
domestic and foreign governments and private sectors.
oss IV Concluding remarks
ore In this paper we analyzed the relation between government spending and
real rates of interest as well as the international transmission of fiscal
policies. Specifically, we examined the dependence of the patterns of
consumption in one country on the level of government spending in the
the rest of the world. For this purpose we developed a general equilibrium
ors model which was characterized by fully integrated world capital markets.
Economic agents were assumed to behave rationally and government
policies were constrained to obey the intertemporal solvency requirement.
It was shown that the effects of changes in countries' net debtor position
47) as well as the effects of government spending can be analyzed by reference
to a multitude of 'transfer problem criteria,' which are familiar from the64 Jacob A. Frenkel and Assaf Razin
theory of international economic transfers. In the present case the impact mt
of policies depended on relations among the spending propensities of rat
domestic and foreign private sectors and governments as well as on the
difference between domestic and foreign saving propensities. For example, qu
we showed that when spending patterns are similar across countries, the im
effect of a permanent rise in government spending on the rate of interest fis
depends on whether the country in question is a saver or a dissaver in the mt
world economy. If the country is a dissaver a rise in government spending tra
lowers domestic consumption and rates of interest and induces a rise in sec
foreign wealth and consumption. Thus, in that case, the international
transmission is positive. The opposite holds when the country is a net saver.
In the more general case the exact nature of the transmission and of the an
effect of government spending on interest rates depends also on comparisons
among the various spending patterns which, in turn, determine the impact tod.
of fiscal policies on the terms of trade. The impact of permanent fiscal an4.
policies on the rates of interest and, thereby, on the nature of the
transmission mechanism also depends on the percentage growth of world
thetates of interest which result from expansionary
fiscal policies tend to be higher, and the international transmission tends res
to be more negative, the faster is the percentage growth of world output. an
Our analysis also drew a distinction between permanent and transitory
policies as well as between current policies and expected future policies.
It was shown that a transitory current fiscal spending, in addition to
crowding out the domestic private sector, must also crowd out the foreign
private sector and, thereby, result in a negative transmission. However, a
transitory future rise in government spending must induce an immediate
increase in foreign private sector's consumption and thereby result in a mci
positive current transmission. In both cases, of course, domestic private of
sector's consumption must fall. These patterns of response reflect themselves imt
in the current account of the balance of payments and in changes in the the
various countries' net debtor-creditor positions.
The distinction between permanent and transitory policies also reflects by
itself in complex changes in the patterns of interest rates. For example, a
transitory future fiscal expansion lowers the rate of interest linking the
present period with the period during which the transitory fiscal change ass1'
occurs. The impact on the rates of interest linking the present period with the'
all other periods depends on the difference between domestic and foreign the
marginal propensities to save. In contrast, a transitory current rise in fiscal
spending must raise the rates of interest pertaining to all maturities. The
rise in short-term rates of interest exceeds the rise in long-term rates and, thee
thereby, the slope of the yield curve changes. F
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interest revealed that even when capital markets are highly integrated, real
rates of interest may differ if spending patterns differ across countries. With
• such differencesin spending patterns,fiscalpolicies exert different
e, quantitative effects on real rates of interest in the various countries. An
implication of this analysis is that in the presence of non-traded goods,
St fiscal policies may also exert different qualitative effects on real rates of
interest in different countries since, depending on the nature of the
• transmission mechanism and on the patterns of government and private
in sectors' spending, the relative prices of non-traded goods, and thereby the
•al price indices, might be negatively correlated between countries.
•r. The examination of the response to future changes is applicable to the
analysis of the impact of the discovery of North Sea oil. That discovery
• changes current wealth, but its impact on the actual flow of oil is expected
ct to occur only in the future. The rise in current wealth stimulates consumption
al and is transmitted internationally through a rise in world interest rates.
Our analysis is subject to several limitations which stem from some of
•Id the simplifying assumptions. We assumed that the output levels were given
ry exogenously. An extension would allow for a process of investment which
is responds to rates of interest and which changes the paths of outputs. Such
it. an extension would modify the pattern of the current account and debt
ry accumulation.'5 The endogeneity of output could also be introduced
s. through the incorporation of some Keynesian features such as price
rigidities. Under such circumstances government spending would alter the
level of economic activity and would be transmitted internationally
a through mechanisms similar to those of the foreign-trade multipliers.
te Further extension would modify the assumption of full certainty. The
a incorporation of uncertainty might raise additional issues such as the role
of bankruptcy and default. In that case, a relevant question would be the
impact of fiscal policies on the likelihood of bankruptcies and defaults in
the international capital markets.
One of the key features of our model has been the central role played
by the path of government spending and the irrelevancy of the path of
a government deficits. Thus, the model conformed with the Ricardian
e proposition. One of the reasons responsible for this feature was the
assumption that all taxes were of the non-distorting variety. As a result
h the time pattern of taxes and government debt issues was irrelevant once
n the pattern of government spending was given. An extension would allow
LI for distorting effects of taxes.'8 Such distortions would introduce new
e considerations associated with the determination of the optimal paths of
I, the various means of government finance.
Finally, our two-country world with exogenous government spendings
enables exploitation of monopoly-monopsony powers in goods and capital
a - 4-
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markets. An extension would determine the optimal pattern of government
spending along with the optimal trade-cum-capital-fiows tax structure ti
along the lines of the optimal tariff literature. Such a strategic behavior F
could then be incorporated into a more elaborate game-theoretic world
equilibrium (see Hamada, 1984). In such a set-up, government spendings
and its means of finance would become endogenous variables that are
determined in the context of world equilibrium.
p
Appendix: The two-commodity stationary system
I The solution of the system b
The solutions of the system for the stationary case can be obtained ti












We then multiply both sides of(26) by;, sum both sides over all t(from




+I8*[m;pg—GE ; +B]=(x—G) (AS)
t—o t—o
Equation(A3), (A4) and (A5) constitute the relevant system for the case
of stationary outputs and fiscal policies. The economic interpretation of
the equation is as follows: Equations(A3)and (A4)describe the equilibrium
in the markets for the two goods in period 0. It is evident that this is aFiscal expenditures and economic interdependence 67
rational expectations equilibrium since the demand functions are based on
the fully expected realization of future values of rates of interest and prices.
ire Equation (A5) requires that the sum of the present values of world demand
tor for good x equal the corresponding sum of world supply. As may be
rid noted we have used Walras Law to ignore the analogous requirement
for good m.
are Using this system we may solve for the three unknowns: The sum of
the present value factors in terms of good x — the sum of the
• present value factors in terms of good m— atPt;and the relative price
• of good minterms of x in the first period —p0.These solutions can then
be used in (Al) and (A2) to obtain the values of W0 and W. These are
the solutions that are reported in the text.
31) II The effects of debt on real consumptions
In this part of the Appendix we derive the effects of debt transfers
1) on the real values of domestic and foreign consumptions. These results are
computed around an initial equilibrium with zero debt and zero government








From (32) we obtain
om dW0fl(1—8)
ing — (A9)
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we may multiply (A 12) by (1 _fl*)anduse (A 10) to obtain equation (37)
in the text.
The effect of the transfer on domestic real consumption is obtained
analogously. We first note that for equation (28): a
dW0 = dW (A13)






Multiplying(A12) by (1 —fi)andsubtracting from (A14) yields equation
(38) in the text. (
111 The effects of fiscal spending on real consumptions
In this part of the Appendix we derive the effects of fiscal policies n
on the real values of domestic and foreign consumptions. As before these
results are computed around and initial equilibrium with zero debt and
zero government spendings. From (32) we obtain
(A15 dxflD a
dWxfl(1—fl)(1—8)
A16 dGmm ,9*2D2 (
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Toconvert (A 19) into a logarithmic derivative we first substitute (A6) for










Multiplying(A21) by (1 _/3*) and subtracting from the logarithmic
derivative of with respect to x (obtained from (A 15) and (A6)) we get
d log whichis equation (39) in the text, with a minus sign (since
dx =
Analogously,dividing (A 17) by (A7) yields the logarithmic derivative
of W0 with respect to x, from which we subtract the product of (1 —fi)and
(A20), to obtain d log c0/dx which is equation (41) in the text (with a minus
sign).
To compute the effects of changes in Gm on real consumptions we first











where R and S are defined in equation (42) in the text. Multiplying (A23)
by (1 _fi*)andsubtracting from the ratio of (A 16) and (A6) yields
equation (40) in the text.
7) Analogously, dividing (A 18) by (A 17) and subtracting the product of
(1 —/3) and (A23) yields equation (42) in the text.
3)
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WTheeffects of fiscal spending on real rates of interest N
In this part of the Appendix we compute the effects of domestic
permanent fiscal spending on domestic and foreign real rates of interest.
For simplicity we focus on the case in which government spending falls
entirely on good x, i.e. the case for which fib =1.
Equation (26) in text around an initial equilibrium with zero government
spending and initial debt implies that
= (A24)





Using (A17) and (A7) for dlog W0/dx, and using (A 15) and (A6) for
diog W/dx, we obtain
dlogcç=0 (A25')
dx
Analogously,from equation (27) we obtain:






Using (Al7) and (Al) for diog and using (A15) and (A6) for
dlog W'/dx, we obtain after subsituting (A25'):
12
! (A26')
As may be observed by comparing (A26') with (A2l), the effect of x on
the initial price p0 is the same as its effect on the entire path of prices,
This result reflects the finding in (A25') where it was shown that the change
of x does not alter the entire path of interest rates.
Finally, logarithmic differentiation of the real present-value factors, 14
and with respect to x, and using (A25') and (A26'), yields
15
equations (47)—(47') in the text.
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4) I 1For surveys of some of this literature see Fair (1979) and Mussa (1979) and
the references therein.
2 See Laursen and Metzler (1950) and Harberger (1950).
3 See contributions by Mundell (1968) and Fleming (1962).
5) 4 See Dornbusch (1976) and Frenkel and Rodriguez (1982).
• 5 See, for example, Mishkin (1984), Hwzinga and Mishkin (1983), Mark (1983)
and Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) for studies of real interest rate equality. On
covered interest arbitrage see Frenkel and Levich (1977).
• 6 For this hypothesis see Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein (1983), and
for some discussions see Harberger (1980) and Tobin (1983).
7 The basic model of these characteristics is developed in Helpman and Razin*
(1982)who study the implications of its monetary counterpart for the analysis
or of exchange rate dynamics.
8 On this see Barro (1974). In Frenkel and Razin (1984) we relax this assumption.
9 On the role of 'transfer problem criteria' see Mussa (1969).
5') 10 In this formulation government spending reduces the resources available for
private sector consumption without yielding utility services. The interaction
between public and private goods in the utility function is a separate issue with
which we do not deal in the present paper. An introduction of a 'useful'
government as a separable argument in the utility function would not alter our
6) results.
11 Formally, this effect can best be illustrated for the stationary case. In that case
(with zero initial debt) the present value factor in (17) can be written as:
(1
(1_8*)A*+(1_8)A (24)
or Differentiating (24) with respect to y and recalling that rg_1 1],
shows that sign =sign(6'—6).
12 The constant term y =ft logft+(l—fi)log(l—ft)is chosen in order to simplify,
without loss of generality, the subsequent expressions of real consumption.
13 In general, to determine the effect of a transfer on the real value of consumption
in terms of the consumer price index, we need to determine the change in the
real value of wealth as well as in the real interest rate (in terms of the consumer
consumption bundle). In the present case, however, since we have used a
logarithmic utility function, the marginal saving propensity is independent of
ge the rate of interest and, therefore, the entire effect of transfers and other policies
on real consumption operate through their effects on real wealth.
14This result follows by noting that the denominator in equation (37) is positive,
d and the minimal value of the numerator cannot fall below a positive number.
S 15 For an analysis of the role of investment in determining the path of the current
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account see Sachs (1981), and for an analysis of the effects of budget deficits H
on investment see Buiter (1984).
16 For an analysis of these effects see Barro (1979), Kydland and Prescott (1980) H
and Razin and Svensson (1983). In a related paper which was originally
presented at the CEPR/NBER Conference on International Economic Policy
Coordination (1984) we analyze the effects of budget deficits in a two-country
model which departs from the Ricardian proposition due to differences
between private and public discount rates. See Frenkel and Razin (1984).
Li
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COMMENT MATTHEW B. CANZONERI
:est
ing Big US deficits and their implications for interest rates and aggregate
md demand, both at home and abroad, are certainly major issues of the day.
29 Frenkel and Razin start from the reasonable position that the entire future
paths of government spending and taxation matter, and that we require
rest an intertemporal utility maximizing approach to analyze the problem. This
position is logically quite reasonable, but it quickly forces the authors into
ter- analytically intractable structures. Consequently, they have to make many
simplifying assumptions: output is exogenous; there are no informational
nec difficulties or price rigidities, no money. Even so, their analysis deserves
our serious attention, for I suspect that their basic results for interest rates74 Comment by Matthew B. Canzonen
and aggregate demand are robust. I might also add that these results are hig
very difficult to derive, even with the simplifying assumptions. Indeed, one
of the authors' major contributions here is to show us how to handle a
very complicated intertemporal structure by aggregating future consump- the
tion into a composite good. car
In an earlier paper, Frenkel and Razin postulated an even simpler of
Ricardian world where the timing of tax liabilities is irrelevant. An infinite nai
lived citizen is both consumer and tax payer. This citizen faces the same Cu
borrowing costs as a consumer and as a tax payer. Thus, if the Government div
lowers current taxes and increases the present value of future tax liabilities im1
correspondingly, the consumer's wealth or permanent income is unaffected; str
a temporary tax cut has no real effect. The simple Ricardian identification Go
between consumers and tax payers yields an elegant and tractable inter- abi
temporal model of demand. Unfortunately, the Ricardian model is all too M
neat and clean if we think that deficits really do matter. ho
A major problem that Frenkel and Razin face in the present paper is to
that there is no consensus on how the Ricardian relationship between Ou
consumers and tax payers ought to be dirtied up; there appears to be no the
simple and appealing way of doing it. Here, the authors follow Yaan and sor
Blanchard in assuming that the individual citizen has only a probability Sus
of surviving until the next period. Consequently, the individual citizen is
required to buy life insurance to guarantee solvency when borrowing to COi
finance consumption. The collective citizenry does' not die, so the Govern-
ment does not have to pay a life insurance premium when it borrows.
The effect of these assumptions is that the individual citizen as consumer
faces higher borrowing costs than the collective citizenry as tax payers.
Now when the Government lowers current taxes and raises the present
value of future tax liabilities correspondingly, wealth of the individual
citizen-consumer goes up, because he discounts the future tax liabilities
more heavily; deficits increase consumer demand. thcl
Frenkel and Razin's results for an increase in the current deficit are to1
straightforward, even if they are hard to derive. Consumption demand in
the US depends upon US wealth; demand in Europe (here the 'other ma
country') depends upon European wealth. Market supply is equal to the 1
exogenous outputs minus the Government purchases. Interest rates work
through wealth to bring demand in line with existing supplies in each md.
period. If President Reagan succeeds in cutting US taxes temporarily ofi
(permanent cuts can not be analyzed in the Frenkel-Razin model unless
growth is introduced), US wealth goes up for the reasons given above, and
at prevailing interest rates the higher US consumption creates an excess
demand for output. Interest rates rise to decrease wealth, both in the US
and in Europe, and clear the market. The result is higher interest rates, SdFiscal expenditures andeconomicinterdependence 75
higherUS consumption and lower European consumption. US deficits are
__
re expansionary at home, but transmit negatively to Europe.
Elsewhere Jo Anna Gray and I have shown that much can be said about
a the direction to move in coordinating macroeconomic policies if only we
I' can agree upon the sign and symmetry of the inter-country spillover effects
er of policy. Last summer at a similar conference on coordination issues I
te naively argued that this should not be too much to ask of the profession.
Current or previous work by the people around this table illustrates the
nt diversity of views that now exist. Frenkel and Razin's theoretical model
es implies negative spillover for fiscal policy. Minford's empirical model has
strong wealth effects in money demand, so a bond financed increase in US
Government spending has small negative effects on output at home and
abroad. Oudiz and Sachs in a previous paper used the FRB's Multi-country
Model and Japan's EPA Model to obtain strong positive effects both at
home and abroad for an increase in US Government spending. Turning
is to monetary policy, Minford reports strong positive spillover effects while
en Oudiz and Sachs found a small negative transmission. I would suggest that
rio the first order of business in policy coordination research is to achieve some
nd sort of consensus on the sign and symmetry of policy spillover effects. I
ity suspect that the assumptions made in this regard are far more important
is than distinctions between utility functions and game theoretic solution






ies Professors Frenkel and Razin produced a very useful paper for
those who attended the conference. Unfortunately they have decided
Lre to shorten their paper, whereas in what follows I deal with the paper as
in actually presented at the Conference. This has advantages, for their full
ter model has richer results than the one presented above.
he The fundamental result of the Conference paper is well known. This is
rk that an increased US budget deficit, resulting from lower US taxes, causes
ch increased spending in the US, and crowds out spending in Europe by means
ily of a rise in the world rate of interest. The novelty of the paper is that the
authors produce this result in a model with well specified microfoundations.
nd Two steps in the argument of the Conference paper are worth noting. First,
there is a government which obeys a solvency constraint over time. Thus
tax cuts in the present mean that taxes will have to be raised in the future.
es, Second there are optimizing consumers, in perfect capital markets, who76 Comment by David Vines
nevertheless do not obey Barro's neo-Ricardian theorem. Thus the present and
tax cuts and future tax increases in the US do cause increased US spending Eun
in the present. This contrasts with the model presented above in which the 'exp
Barro theorem always holds. chaz
The model is as follows. There are two countries (the US and Europe) curr
and (in the simple version solved explicitly) only two time periods. There ther
is also an integrated capital market with just one rate of interest: the F
relative price of present and future goods. 'Full employment' prevails: for I
output is supply constrained and fixed. and
Much of the paper is taken up with an exposition of the clever device,
due to Blanchard, which enables the authors to escape from the results of
the Barro theorem. The essential feature of this is that if a government cuts
taxes now and plans to raise them in the future (in such a way as to remain my
solvent over time) then individuals know that there is a probability that of ti
they will not be alive in the future to pay the future taxes. Therefore the (a)
current reduction in taxes adds to present wealth, and this addition to (b)
wealth will add to present spending.
With this point established, the authors proceed as follows. In their
one-commodity, two-country, two-time-period world, there are three I
endogenous variables: US wealth, European wealth, and the relative price of
of present and future goods. A present tax cut and a future tax rise in the Sen
US leads to an increase in consumption in the US in the present. The price inte
of present goods rises i.e. the rate of interest rises. This rise in the rate of the
interest reduces the present value of European future income i.e. European L
wealth falls. European consumption thus falls. The US runs a balance of a Ei
payments deficit and Europe runs a balance of payments surplus. The All
increase in US spending caused by the budget deficit has crowded out
European spending by means of a rise in the world rate of interest. g
It should be noted that there is nothing intrinsically international about r
all this. A similar result would be obtained upon analysing a single
economy with an integrated capital market and two groups: one that pays
a particular kind of tax and the other that does not. The analagous e
experiment would involve postponing the obligations of the first group to
pay the tax.
In the paper included in this volume, Frenkel and Razin do add an extra
international wrinkle to the analysis. In the present paper they treat US
goods and European goods as less-than-perfect substitutes: a rise in
spending in the US will not only raise the rate of interest, but will also raise I
the relative price of US goods (on plausible assumptions about home A.
expenditures being biased towards home goods). This rise in the relative
aswitching of expenditures towards European
goods in both countries. This helps to relieve the excess demand in the US,
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and creates excess demand for European goods (which is what crowds out
European spending). In the model complicated inthis way these
ng 'expenditure switching'effects work jointly with the 'expenditure
.he changing' effects to establish the US current account deficit and European
current account surplus. In the one good model of the Conference paper
pe) there are only 'expenditure changing' effects.
ere Frenkel and Razin also produced some new results at the Conference
e for the effects of a balanced budget increase in US government spending,
1S. and these results are new1.
ice,
In this section 1 want to throw out a couple of new arguments of
am my own. My purpose is to relax two assumptions which underly the model
hat of the Frenkel—Razin Conference paper. These are
the (a) the full employment assumption for Europe
to (b) the idea that the trade balance between the US and Europe adjusts
instantly to changes in relative prices.
I share many of Frenkel's and Razin's assumptions, in particular that
-nce of an integrated world market. But for simplicity my analysis has no
the serious microfoundations, unlike that of Frenkel and Razin. There is no
rice international budget constraint on the government, and no treatment of
• the Barro argument (indeed, no treatment of wealth effects at all).
ean Let us define the following variables and parameters. A star, *,denotes
of a European variable or parameter. Unstarred magnitudes refer to the US.
rhe All variables are defined as deviations from an initial equilibrium.
out y output
g,g*government spending
out r,r* rateof interest (real)
gle z USnet exports (i.e. the US balance of trade surplus)
ays m* Europeanmoney supply (nominal)
OUS e exchangerate (real), a rise in edenotesa real depreciation of
to the US currency
x expected rate of (real) depreciation of the US currency
:tra e Longrun equilibrium (real) exchange rate
fi, fit,y, h,and 0 are parameters, all positive
sise I make the following assumptions.
A. Output in the US is constant at a fixed full employment level; this is
tive assured by wage and price flexibility
ean
US, y=o (I)78 Comment by David Vines
The US interest rate is a loanable funds phenomenon, unalterable by
monetary policy, determined from the equation
y=x(g+z)—flr (2)
where a is an expenditure multiplier and ftdependsupon the interest
elasticities of private sector savings and investment.
In Europe wage and price stickiness and unemployment prevail. Output
and the interest rate are determined in the normal manner2
m* _a*(g*_z)_ft*r* (3)
y* =8*(g* — z) — e*r* (4)
wherefi, are reduced-form parameters from an IS-LM system.3
Note that equation (3) determinesjust as equation (2) determines r, but
that a* and ft*areamalgams of parameters different in kind from those
making up a and ft.Thisis because of the different assumptions about wage
and price flexibility for the US, and for Europe.
B. I ignore the Barro theorem, ignore wealth effects, and subsume the
consumption function in the parameters of the above equations. sb
C. I assume perfect international capital mobility and abstract from the co
need to model the effects of the intertemporal solvency constraints on
government and nations. (I need, however, to assume that there is no fear SIX
of insolvency).4 Thus
r=r*+x (5)
D.Exchange rate expectations are regressive and consistent, ca
so
(6) as
Expectations will be rational for one and only one value of 0,butfor ease
of exposition we do not explicitly solve for, or require that 0takes,that
value.
E. There is alag in the response of the trade balance, z, to the real exchange
rate, e m
±=h(ye—z} (7) re
We abstract for simplicity from the effect of changes in European output,
y*, upon the trade balance. Including this effect would not alter the basic
picture.
These seven equations contain eight endogenous variables, y, y, r, r*,
x, e, ë, and z.












This equation is plotted as the line, ZZ,infigure 2A.l. The line is upward
sloping because in the long run, US net exports will be larger, the more
competitive is the US economy.
In the shortrun, forgivenand given z, we may solve the remaining
six equations for the other six unknowns which include e. We obtain
e =ë+[a*flg* _afl*g —(a*fl+ czfl)z]/(flfl*8) _m*/(fl*O) (9)
This is the asset market equilibrium locus, AA, in figure 2A.l. A special
case of this occurs when a =aand fi= fl*. (Sucha special case is
somewhat unlikely since, as noted above, the starred parameters represent
amalgams of parameters different in kind from those making up a and fl.5)
Thisspecial case gives
e = (9a)
This simplification makes clear the general idea underlying (9). Relatively
inge higher government expenditure in the US, and a US trade surplus, and
monetary expansion in Europe, all give rise to an appreciation of the US
(7) real exchange rate relative to long run equilibrium, because they all raise
put US interest rates relative to European interest rates.
Long run equilibrium exists at the point of intersection of the AA and
ZZlines in figure 2A.l.
Consider now the effects of an increase in US government spending, g.
The AA locus shifts to the left. In the short run r* is unaffected and US
interest rates must rise enough to fully crowd out the increase in
government expenditure. The exchange rate overshoots to give expectations
(8) of depreciation offsetting the increase in the US interest rate. Gradually
z
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the US trade balance worsens and so demands for European goods
increase and European interest rates rise. Finally r*= r andwe obtain the in e
following equations for the long run equilibrium solutions.
e= e = (10)
r== (11) 1
pre
The whole process is depicted in figure 2A.l. tio,
We may thus draw from our analysis the following tentative conclusions res
about the effects of a US fiscal expansion. wit]
(1) Initially there is a real exchange rate overshoot and the interest rate imi
effects stay in the US. The US interest rate overshoots and European gov
interest rates do not move. oni
(2) Gradually the real exchange rate returns part of the way to full a r€
equilibrium and an effect on the European interest rate comes about via of
the aggregate demand effect of the European balance of trade surplus. Eui
European output rises, to the extent permitted by the elasticity of demand
for money in Europe. The deficit is 'paid for' partly by crowding out in an i
the US, partly by the crowding out of interest-sensitive expenditures in 1
Europe, and partly by the bringing into use of previously unemployed acci
resources in Europe. on
(3) Monetary expansion in Europe would alter this conclusion. A rett
managed gradual expansion of the European money supply could, in and
principle, prevent European interest rates from ever rising. US interest to
rates would then have to eventually return to their original level. This
would bring about, in the long run, a larger expansion in Europe, a larger for
European surplus and US deficit, and a larger appreciation of the dollar, it n
There would then by no crowding out at all of interest-sensitive expenditures 'pa
in Europe: saving out of the income earned by previously unemployed
factors of production would entirely pay for the US fiscal expansion (and, of
because, of multiplier effects output would necessarily rise in Europe by us
more than the amount of this fiscal expansion). Of course this third
conclusion would fail completely when full employment was regained in inst4
Europe. In that case assumption A* would break down. a sil
'II
What are the implications of the analysis in previous section for
cooperation in economic management between the US and Europe? In couP
order to isolate just one major implication, let us return to assumptions It
more nearly like those underlying the Frenkel and Razin Conference paper. to
First we now assume fixed full-employment output, with a loanable-funds the
theory of the interest rate, for Europe.° This replaces assumption AC with be sFiscal expenditures and economic interdependence 81
Dds something identical to assumption A, so that the term m* is set to zero
the rn equations (3), (9), (9a), (10), and (11) and thus the interpretation of
and flbecomeslike that of cXandft.Secondwe now assume instantaneous
adjustment of net exports, so that h-÷and equations (10) and (11) apply
10) at all times.
11) The consequences of the change in US fiscal policy, analysed in the
previous section, can be redescribed as follows under these new assump-
tions. The increase in government spending increases the use of US
ons resources for consumption and reduces the use of them for investment. But
with integrated capital markets, this change in the US output mix has
rate implications for the rest of the world. In as much as the increase in US
ean government spending raises the world rate of interest, it is 'paid for' not
only by increased US saving and by reduced US investment, but also by
full a reduction in US exports relative to US imports. This is a running down
via of US foreign investment, or (what is the same thing) an increase in
European foreign investment in the US. Europe must accept a reduction
•and in interest sensitive investment in capital assets at home and accept instead
it in an increase in its ownership of assets in the US.
s in There are reasons why, at the margin, Europe might prefer asset
eyed accumulation at home to asset accumulation in the US. These reasons rest
on the possibility that investment at home, even if it provides a private
• A return on capital no greater than that abroad, may increase the productivity
in and well being of the labour force at home and so bring a social return
rest to the home economy greater than the private return on capital. It is
rhis interesting to note that these reasons are the very same as those put
rger forward by Feldstein et. al. (1984, pp. 57 and 63) in order to explain why
Uar. it may be desirable for the US that the fiscal expansion in the US be partly
.ires 'paid for' by Europe!
yed We have thus uncovered a situation in which there are two objectives
Lfld, of policy: the split in output between consumption and investment in the
by US and the analogous split in Europe. There are two instruments of policy:
iird fiscal policy in the US and fiscal policy in Europe. But these two
I in instruments are under the control of separate policy makers. And we have
a situation in which each policy maker may wish to avoid lowering the
investment share of output in his own country and to do this in such a
way which would lower the investment share of output in the other
for country. This is the classic kind of case in which international cooperation
In could be beneficial.
.0fl5 It is possible that the outcome of any such cooperation should be close
per. to the outcome which would be preferred by Europe rather than close to
rids the outcome which would be preferred by the US. This conjecture could
with be supported by both income-maximising and income-distributional argu-
a82 Comment by David Vines
ments.Europe is less capital-rich than the US. Thus a transfer of capital
from the US to Europe would, ceteris panbus, increase world income and
distributeit more equally.
NOTES R
*am indebted to Martin Weale for comments.
IA present rise in government spending raises US demand for goods since
consumption falls by less than the tax increase. This raises the rate of interest Bu
and depresses both US and European wealth. There is a US deficit and a
European surplus. Not only the US private sector but also the Europeans are
crowded out. By contrast, an expected futurebalancedbudget increase in US
government spending causes an increase in the future tax burden in the US:
wealth and spending in the US fall. Frenkel and Razin also produced some Frc.
further results about the effects of a future tax cut balanced by a tax rise even
further into the future. F1
2 Note that the larger is the US trade surplus, z, the smaller is the demand for
European goods.
3 Patrick Minford has pointed out to me that the outcome for European output
and employment will differ according to exactly which wages and prices are L
assumed sticky in Europe. This is true. The equations in the text assume that
all nominal wages and prices in Europe are exogenous, independent of both
output and the real exchange rate. M
Money wage rigidity combined with effects on diMinishing returns and with
effects of the nominal exchange rate upon the price level would give a more Vt
complex system. But it would still be a system with the main features in the
text, namely one for which European output would be positively affected by S
(1), a US trade deficit (2), higher European government spending, and (3) an
increase in the nominal European money supply.
But if real wages were completely rigid (or worse if they needed to rise with
any increase in activity) then the point about unemployment being made in
Section II would collapse. An increase in the European nominal money supply
would not increase European output. And an increase in the US trade deficit
would, if anything, be associated with a reduction in European output, since
it is associated with a deterioration of the European terms of trade, and this
would shift the European aggregate supply curve to the left. There is some
evidence about the existence of such real wage resistance in Europe (Sachs,
1984, but see Layard et a!., 1984).
4 Otherwise currency and default risk for the US will drive a wedge into equation
(5). This may be a real possibility: US fiscal expansion couldleadto a collapse
of the US real exchange rate, rather than leading to the appreciation studied
below. See Eaton and Turnovsky (1983).
5 It becomes more plausible if there is full employment in Europe (see section
III).
6 We have entirely abstracted in our analysis from the case in which there is
nominal wage stickiness in both the US and Europe. Meade (1984) argues that
this calls for a cooperation in economic management between US and EuropeFiscal expenditures and economic interdependence 83
of a kind which would require fiscal management to bear a greater responsibility
ta for domestic demand management than it does at present in the US. Monetary
nd policywould then be freed to stabilise the real exchange rate. See also Vines,
Maciejowski and Meade (1983).
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